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Abstract
European Union (EU) integration has boosted inward EU foreign direct investment (FDI) 
into the United Kingdom (UK). Within the EU, the UK has a relatively significant stock of 
inward FDI, having reached 61% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2017 and risen 
strongly since 2005. The exit of the UK from the EU and the Single Market will probably 
result in reduced FDI amongst both investment destinations. The aim of this study is to look 
at the “real-time” effects of the Brexit June 2016 referendum outcome and its aftermath 
on UK-related FDI activity. Although FDI flows are notably volatile and biased by periodic 
non-systematic outliers, and despite some caveats on data sources and availability of 
time series data, we find tentative evidence of a post-referendum slowdown in gross FDI 
flows between the UK and the EU, notably involving the big EU economies and Ireland. 
Regarding a very favoured form of FDI, greenfield FDI, we document a post-referendum fall 
in announced projects and capital expenditures into the UK by both other EU countries as 
well as one of the most important non-EU partners, the United States.
A different approach is also used to analyse the Brexit effect on FDI activity, based on 
estimating the effect of two successive stages in the European integration process 
– EU membership and the Euro area launch – and considering Brexit effects as the reversal 
of the UK integration into the EU. By using a fixed-effect gravity model to estimate the 
effects of these integration processes on bilateral FDI activity with the UK, the empirical 
results suggest that, on the one hand, this country played a role as a gateway for a 
set of international investor countries outside the Euro area to enter European markets and, 
on the other, it acted as a hub that reallocated these inflows and those coming from Euro 
countries across the Euro area itself. Thus the disconnection of the UK from the EU may 
have further implications for FAI than just reverting the effect of EU membership. Larger 
trade barriers and lower integration between the UK and the Euro area countries’ markets 
will likely have a negative impact on FDI activity in the UK and might have, in the short run, 
a negative effect in the Euro area.
Keywords: foreign direct investment, FDI, Brexit, EU membership, single currency.
JEL classification: F15, F21.
Resumen
La integración en la Unión Europea (UE) ha impulsado la inversión extranjera directa (IED) 
hacia el Reino Unido, que mantiene un stock relativamente  importante de entradas en 
forma de IED. Este ha aumentado notablemente desde 2005, alcanzando el 61% de su 
producto interior bruto (PIB) en 2017. La salida del Reino Unido de la UE y del Mercado Único 
probablemente resultará en flujos de IED más reducidos entre ambos destinos de inversión. 
El objetivo de este estudio es examinar los efectos que el resultado del referéndum del brexit, 
de junio de 2016, ha podido tener en la actividad de IED relacionada con el Reino Unido. 
Si bien los flujos de IEA son notablemente volátiles, con presencia de un gran número de 
valores atípicos, y con la cautela precisa por la escasa disponibilidad de datos temporales 
posteriores al referéndum, el análisis encuentra cierta evidencia de una disminución en 
los flujos brutos de IED entre el Reino Unido y la UE con posterioridad al referéndum. Esto 
se evidencia, en particular, en el caso de las grandes economías de la UE y en el de Irlanda. 
Con respecto a una forma particular de IED, inversión en nuevos proyectos (greenfield IED), 
se encuentra evidencia de un descenso en proyectos anunciados y gastos de capital en 
el Reino Unido por parte de otros países de la UE en el período posterior al referéndum, 
así como en la inversión proveniente de Estados Unidos, uno de los socios más importantes 
no pertenecientes a la UE.
Para analizar el efecto de brexit en la actividad de IED, se utiliza también un enfoque diferente, 
basado en estimar el efecto que tuvieron sobre la inversión exterior dos etapas del proceso 
de integración europea: la adhesión a la UE de los distintos Estados miembros y el comienzo de 
la moneda única en la zona del euro. La hipótesis que subyace es que los efectos del brexit 
pueden considerarse como la reversión del proceso de integración del Reino Unido en la UE. 
El análisis utiliza un modelo de gravedad de efectos fijos para estimar los efectos de estos 
procesos de integración en la actividad de IED bilateral con el Reino Unido. Los resultados 
empíricos sugieren que este país desempeñó, por un lado, un papel como puerta de entrada 
para un conjunto de países inversores internacionales, fuera de la zona del euro, para entrar 
en los mercados europeos y, por otro lado, actuó como un centro que reasignó estas entradas 
y las provenientes de los países del euro entre toda la zona del euro. Por tanto, la desconexión 
del Reino Unido de la UE puede tener implicaciones para la IED que van más allá de la mera 
reversión de los flujos de IED que, en promedio, se han derivado de la incorporación de un 
país a la UE. Las mayores barreras comerciales y una menor integración entre el Reino Unido 
y los mercados de los países de la zona del euro probablemente tendrán un impacto negativo 
en la actividad de IED en el Reino Unido y podrían tener, a corto plazo, también un efecto 
negativo en la zona del euro.
Palabras clave: inversión exterior directa, pertenencia a la UE, moneda única, brexit.
Códigos JEL: F15, F21.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 7 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1913
INDEX
Abstract  5
Resumen  6
1 Introduction and relevance 8
2  Analysis and recent trends of FDI flows vis-à-vis the UK 10
3  An econometric exercise: The “Brexit effect” on foreign direct investment in the UK 
and the EU countries 15
  3.1 Estimating the Brexit effect on FDI 15
  3.2  Empirical strategy and data 16
  3.3  Estimation results 17
4 Conclusions 22
ANNEX:  Methodological and compilation issues concerning the measurement of FDI 23
References 26
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 8 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1913
1 Introduction and relevance
It is well established that foreign direct investment (FDI) is a source of economic growth and jobs. 
FDI increases productivity, boosts capital allocation and is a crucial link in global value chains. 
In addition, it improves competition, trade, innovation and technology transfer. Furthermore, 
it is seen as a more robust form of international capital fl ows. FDI provides a means for creating 
direct, stable and long-lasting links between economies. FDI is thus a category of cross-
border investment made by a resident in one economy (the direct investor) with the objective 
of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise (the direct investment enterprise) resident 
in an economy other than the one of the direct investor. The motivation of the direct investor is 
a strategic long-term relationship with the direct investment enterprise to ensure a signifi cant 
degree of infl uence by the direct investor in the management of the direct investment enterprise. 
The “lasting” interest is evidenced when the direct investor owns at least 10% of the voting power 
of the direct investment enterprise.1 This may involve either creating an entirely new enterprise 
(so-called “greenfi eld” investment) or, more typically, changing the ownership of existing 
enterprises (via mergers and acquisitions). Other types of fi nancial transactions between related 
enterprises, like reinvesting the earnings of the FDI enterprise or other capital transfers, are also 
defi ned as FDI.
According to the recent trends in EU capital fl ows,2 net cross-border investment 
in the EU remained negative in 2016 and the fi rst three quarters of 2017 with outward FDI larger 
than inward investment. The EU remained the most-targeted investment destination globally 
in 2017 through extra-EU mergers and acquisitions (M&A) of European companies, although it 
is expected to be overtaken by the US with regard to greenfi eld investments. In contrast to the rest 
of the world, cross-border M&A continued to increase in the EU in 2017 due to intra-EU activity. 
For the fi rst time since the crisis, intra-EU acquisitions were higher than extra-EU acquisitions 
with the latter still remaining at a high level, but declining due to lower infl ows from the US. Global 
greenfi eld FDI showed a signifi cant decline in 2017 due to a general decrease across the EU 
of investments from outside, whilst intra-EU investments remained.
European integration has actually boosted cross-border FDI fl ows. Studies that 
recently have revisited the effect of EU integration on FDI infl ows estimate that EU membership 
boosted inward FDI fl ows strongly. An econometric exercise using a gravity model and an 
EU dummy (see below) confi rms that EU membership increased cross-border FDI fl ows 
and stocks. Bruno et al (2016) found that joining the EU raised FDI infl ows by on average 
28%.3 This fi gure is in the ballpark of results in other studies. Likewise, it is to be expected 
that leaving the EU and the Single Market will have negative effects on FDI infl ows into the 
UK. The UK becomes a less attractive investment destination if, amongst other factors, 
its trading relationship with the EU becomes signifi cantly restricted and net migration falls. 
1 Cf. OECD Benchmark Defi nition of Foreign Direct Investment-Fourth edition (BD4), 2008. 
2  Cf. Annual EFC Report to the Commission and the Council on the Movement of Capital and the Freedom of Payments, 
March 2018.
3  Bruno, Campos, Estrin and Tian (2016), “Gravitating towards Europe: An Econometric Analysis of the FDI Effects of EU 
Membership”.
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The abovementioned study predicts a fall in FDI infl ows of 22%. While it is not to be expected 
that capital mobility barriers emerge in the UK or the EU,4 the endogenous effect on capital 
mobility, such as FDI fl ows, should be investigated. 
Figure 1 documents the attractiveness of several EU countries as an FDI destination.5 
Within the EU, the UK has a relatively signifi cant stock of inward FDI, having reached 61% of 
its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2017 and risen strongly since 2005 (31%). Since 2009, 
the UK looks more attractive for FDI than the EU, although both have approached their positions 
as investment destinations more recently (Figure 2). The importance of other EU countries as 
investment origins for the UK is shown by Figure 3, which depicts the origins of the inward 
FDI stock in the UK for 2017, when 43% of the inward FDI stock in the UK originated from 
the other EU countries.
4  Some restrictions on FDI fl ows do exist, as is documented by the OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index 
Nevertheless, internationally, the European FDI restrictions are amongst the lowest in the world. As the UK is sending 
signals that it wants to eliminate regulations, it is not to be expected that it will increase FDI restrictions post-Brexit.
5 We thank the ECB for data assistance on intra-EU and OECD for extra-EU FDI data.
SOURCE: OCDE.
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INWARD FDI STOCK OVER TIME (2017) FIGURE 2
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2 Analysis and recent trends of FDI flows vis-à-vis the UK
We analyse FDI fl ows of EU and non-EU countries vis-à-vis the UK in the light of the referendum 
outcome of June 2016. Our main goal is to check whether the Brexit vote at the end of 2016Q2 
materially affected FDI fl ows in the UK. In theory, the UK could have become a less attractive FDI 
destination for two reasons. First, with Brexit, the probability of the UK losing the EU Passport 
and thus Single Market access has become higher. Second, as trade barriers are likely 
to emerge, value chain participation becomes less straightforward, which may lead companies to 
redirect FDI to other markets. As the referendum was held at the end of June, we can compare 
the period until 2016Q2 as the pre-Brexit era and the period starting in 2016Q3 as the Brexit 
era. Note that anticipation effects could already have led to a dampening in FDI fl ows to the UK 
in the pre-Brexit period.
a General FDI, Intra-EU6
A slowdown in FDI fl ows from the EU-27 into the UK is masked by substantial fl uctuations 
in quarterly data. Therefore, we show a 4-quarter moving average of FDI-fl ows (Figure 4). 
While the infl ows in the years before the Brexit referendum averaged well over EUR 20 billion 
quarterly, the four most recent quarters (2017-Q4 to 2018-Q3) show average outfl ows of more 
than EUR 2 billion per quarter. A similar pattern emerges for the UK’s FDI fl ows to the EU-27: 
the pre-referendum quarterly fi gure averaged EUR 15 billion in outfl ows, against average infl ows 
of EUR 3 billion in the four most recent quarters analysed.
Although FDI fl ows are notably volatile and biased by periodic non-systematic outliers, 
and that some caveats on data sources and availability of (still too early) time series data may be 
identifi ed, tentative evidence is found of a post-referendum slowdown in gross FDI fl ows from 
big EU economies and Ireland into the UK.
In an attempt to clean the data for one-offs, we separated the four biggest Euro area 
economies, Germany, France, Italy and Spain (Figure 5). Interestingly, a Brexit effect seems 
6  Data source for this section: ECB. Please refer to the Annex for methodological and compilation issues regarding the 
measurement of FDI.
SOURCE: ONS.
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noticeable, although more recently a rebound is visible. Gross FDI flows from these “Big 4” to the 
UK (to the tune of EUR 5.5 billion) fell to a substantially lower average post-referendum (EUR 0.5 
billion, up to 2017Q4). In the last three quarters of our sample period, there is a clear recover to 
an average of EUR 10 billion, whereas for the EU-27 the trend is downwards. Gross FDI flows 
from the UK to the Big 4 also seem to be affected by the referendum outcome. They averaged 
EUR 5 billion before and EUR 2 billion after the referendum. 
Another interesting case is Ireland, which is estimated to be the most strongly impacted 
EU member state by Brexit. Although data are volatile, strong gross outflows from Ireland to 
the UK in 15Q4-16Q1 dried up around the referendum and even reversed in 16Q3. During the 
most recent quarters, FDI-flows from Ireland to the UK fell to around zero. In addition, a similar 
pattern is detected for flows from the UK to Ireland (Figure 6).
Although FDI flows are notably volatile and biased by periodic non-systematic outliers, 
and that some caveats on data sources and availability of (still too early) time series data may 
be identified, tentative evidence is found of a post-referendum slowdown in gross FDI flows from 
big EU economies and Ireland into the UK. 
SOURCE: ECB.
FDI FLOWS BETWEEN EU27 AND UK FIGURE 4
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b General FDI, Extra-EU7
We complement this exercise with an extra-EU perspective. It is possible that Brexit makes 
the UK a less attractive FDI destination for non-EU investors, for the reasons mentioned above 
(losing EU Passport and access to Single Market, disruption in value chains). We make use 
of OECD data on bilateral FDI fl ows of OECD countries vis-à-vis the UK. Data are yearly and only 
available by the end of year t+1. The fi nal year of data production is 2017, therefore only one 
full post-referendum year is presented and thus any possible Brexit-related effects could only so 
far be visible for that year.
Regarding fl ows, it is early to distil a “referendum effect” in 2016 and 2017. Bilateral 
FDI fl ows from various other non-EU OECD countries increased in 2016 with respect to 2015, 
but fell again in 2017. This is evidenced for the US in Figure 7. For Japan, the other big non-EU 
investor in the UK, a similar pattern emerges.
7 Data source for this section: OECD.
SOURCE: ECB.
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c Trends in greenfield FDI
FDI increased sharply in the late 1990s, consisting mainly of mergers and acquisitions 
in developed countries (including privatization deals) of existing businesses as compared 
with greenfield investment. This type of investment has been important for the new Central 
European countries, but the value of such investment is small compared with the bulk 
of total FDI. 
Amongst the different forms of FDI (mergers and acquisitions, extension of capital 
and financial restructuring), greenfield FDI8 is regarded as very favourable and likely to contribute 
to the destination country’s economy. It is a form of FDI in which new enterprises are 
established by means of direct investment. Brexit might also impact this particular form of FDI as, 
for example, heightened uncertainty concerning the future trading relationship with the EU 
reduces the attractiveness of the UK to attract new operations. Although the UK has not formally 
exited the Single Market and the EU yet, post-referendum anticipation effects could already 
be visible in the data.
We make use of the FDI Markets database, a service by the Financial Times 
which is the leading standard regarding greenfield FDI trends.9 Although concerns 
exist pertaining  to the reliability of the data,10 we have no evidence of a more timely or 
robust indicator regarding greenfield FDI trends.
Regarding European flows to the UK, we observe a decline in announced greenfield 
FDI projects and capital expenditure post-referendum. This is evidenced from Figures 8 and 9. 
The substantial decreases in the last part of the sample coincide with the timing of the referendum 
outcome mid-2016. The latter decrease is in line with previous declines, such as during 
the Global Financial Crisis (2008-09) and the euro crisis (2011-13). This is also the case for data 
on new jobs related to greenfield FDI (not shown).
This post-referendum decline is also visible in data on US greenfield FDI into the EU 
and UK.11 The relative share of the UK as a destination of US greenfield FDI capital expenditure 
into the EU fell from 46% pre-referendum (2015) to 32% post-referendum (2017). In addition, 
a decline in the share of announced projects is documented (Figure 10). A similar decline in 
planned capital expenditure was observed in 2012-13 (euro crisis). One could take into account 
that Brexit-induced uncertainty not only led to a fall in foreign direct investment, but perhaps 
also hurt overseas companies (and economies) with exposure to the UK, to the extent that the 
strong negative effects identified on capital investment and employment decisions of UK-exposed 
American firms is only one of the many channels through which uncertainty is transmitted across 
8   According to the current version of the OECD Benchmark Definition of FDI (BD4), these are the four types of operation 
that qualify as FDI.
9   We follow the rationale provided by the European Political Strategy Center in the Greenfield Investment Monitor 
(see, for example, Issue 2 in July 2017).
10  Data collected by FDI Markets are announcements of investments by companies, a method which has been criticized 
by statisticians, because these are announcements, not effective FDI operations. 
11 The US is the biggest (greenfield) FDI investor into the EU, responsible for 60% of inward greenfield FDI in 2017Q1.
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SOURCE: FDI Markets.
a EU countries considered are UK, Germany, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, Poland, Belgium, Italy, Sweden and Austria.
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borders. Brexit can thus be seen as a warning to the major economies of the world, to the extent 
that countries being ever more connected into the global economy, domestic political uncertainty 
becomes internationally relevant.12 Regarding shares of other EU countries in receiving US 
greenfi eld FDI, the UK’s loss was mirrored by gains in Germany, France, Spain, Poland, Italy and 
Sweden (Figure 11). 
3  An econometric exercise: The “Brexit effect” on foreign direct investment in the UK 
and the EU countries
3.1 Estimating the Brexit effect on FDI
As noted above, the formation of the EU coincided with increased FDI activity, while (the 
anticipation of) Brexit seems to reduce it. We complement the aforementioned “real-time” 
fi ndings with an econometric gravity exercise. Indeed, Brexit effects may be viewed as the 
reversal of the consequences of the UK integration into the EU. Though it is far from clear 
that the outcome of both processes were to be symmetric, the most widely used approach 
to assess its effects is based on the estimated impact of EU membership since there is no 
previous case of a country withdrawal from the EU. 
The impact of free trade agreements – or economic agreements which reduce 
barriers to trade – on foreign direct investment (FDI) is theoretically ambiguous since 
it is usually linked to the nature or motivation for this investment. According to the literature, 
there are mainly two different types of foreign direct investment: vertical investment takes 
place when multi-plants fragment production into different stages located in different 
areas (frequently taking advantage of differences in factor prices across countries) and horizontal 
investment, which is adopted by multi-plant fi rms that produce similar goods or services 
in different countries – possibly as a result of a decision to replace exports to these markets with 
12 See “Exporting Uncertainty: The Impact of Brexit on Corporate America” (Campello et al., 2018).
SOURCE: FDI Markets.
a EU countries considered are UK, Germany, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, Poland, Belgium, Italy, Sweden and Austria.
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localised production, in order to save on transport costs or remove the impact of trade barriers –. 
If a trade agreement leads to reduced trade costs, it may decrease the need for horizontal FDI. 
On the other hand, lower barriers to capital mobility and reduced transaction costs can increase 
vertical FDI.13 Nonetheless, empirical studies tend to fi nd that EU membership and Monetary 
Union increased FDI infl ows.14
The most common approach in international economics to estimate the effects 
of free trade agreements is the gravity model which explains bilateral cross-border fl ows 
based on the relative size of countries and the distance between them. A country’s economic 
size is expected to have a positive effect on bilateral fl ows (trade, migration, investment…) 
while distance (geographical, cultural, regulatory…) is expected to have a negative 
effect. A free trade agreement usually implies a reduction of barriers (a distance factor) 
to cross-border fl ows. Empirical studies using this model generally follow two types 
of econometric methodology: the most traditional one, which includes size and distance 
variables, and the most recent one, based on the inclusion of fi xed effects to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity and mitigate biased estimates due to omitted variables. 
To estimate the “Brexit effect” on FDI fl ows, we use a fi xed-effect gravity model in line with Head 
and Mayer (2014) and UNCTAD and WTO (2016).
3.2 Empirical strategy and data
The standard gravity model specifi cation includes indicators of country size and “distance” 
variables as in the following equation:
lnFDIijt = α0 + α1 lnGDPit + α2 lnGDPjt + α3 lnDistanceij + β1 FTAijt + ϵijt               (1)
where lnFDIijt denotes FDI fl ows (in logs) from the country of origin “i” (i.e. capital exporter) 
to the country of destination “j” (i.e. capital importer) at time t; FTA is a dummy that 
identifi es country pairs with a free trade agreement in place; lnDistanceij is a set of distance 
variables (geographic, cultural, other) between country i and country j. These are usually 
time-invariant characteristics that may be correlated with the likelihood of forming an FTA 
and if some of them were omitted in the specifi cation, estimates of β1 could be biased. 
Therefore the most recent approaches include country-pair fi xed-effects15 to absorb all 
these time-invariant characteristics and control for country-pair unobserved heterogeneity 
(ηij is the country-pair fi xed-effect): 
lnFDIijt = α0 + α1 lnGDPit + α2 lnGDPjt + β1 FTAijt + ηij + ϵijt                      (2)
In some specifi cations the effect of time-varying origin and destination country 
variables (like GDP, population…) is captured through country-time fi xed effects both for origin 
and destination countries (γit and δjt). The main purpose is to mitigate ‘omitted variable’ bias in 
13 Horizontal FDI would also benefi t from reduced transaction costs.
14 Some examples are Straathof et al. (2008), Petroulas (2007) and Sousa and Lochard (2011).
15 See Baier and Bergstrand (2007).
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estimating β1 in the same way as with time-invariant characteristics and, in the framework of 
structural gravity models, these fi xed-effects also give account of multilateral resistance terms.16
Our basic specifi cation uses this latter approach:
ln FDIijt = α0 + β1 FTAijt + β2 EUijt + β3 EU_ukijt + γit + δjt + ηij + ϵijt               (3)
EU variables have been added to estimate the effect of EU membership on FDI. EUijt is 
a dummy which takes value 1 when both countries are member states of the European Union 
(EU) at time t, but neither of them is the UK; EU_ukijt is also a dummy, which is equal to 1 when 
both countries are member states of the EU and one of them is the UK. This variable intends to 
capture a possible differential effect of infl ows to (and outfl ows from) the UK due to its role as a 
hub for FDI and fi nancial fl ows. In equation (3) origin and destination country-time fi xed-effects 
capture the impact of time varying country-size variables. A similar fi xed-effects specifi cation 
is followed in several recent studies.17
The use of logs poses the problem that only positive data can be used in the estimation 
what may lead to a selection bias. To address this issue a Heckman selection model is estimated 
to give account of the likelihood of positive fi gures.18 The fact that many observations are zero 
could be dealt with by using Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood methods, as proposed by 
Santos, Silva and Tenreyro (2006). However, this method cannot be used if there are negative 
fi gures in the database, which is the case for FDI fl ows and stocks data.19 Therefore, Poisson 
model is less helpful for FDI data than in the cases of trade and migration gravity equations.
Data used covers 34 OECD countries between 1986 and 2013 which are 
the reporting countries. The counterpart countries belong to all world regions and its number 
is much larger (over 300 partner countries). Data sources for these FDI fi gures are harmonized 
balance of payments statistics according to the IMF SixthEdition of the Balance of Payments 
and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6). Most studies use either fl ows or stocks 
separately to estimate the impact of trade agreements. In our analysis we use both because
the impact of a trade agreement may be short-lived or more persistent what may give 
rise to different effects in fl ows and stocks. 
3.3 Estimation results
The results of estimating equation (3) for both inward fl ows and stocks are presented in 
Table 1 (fi rst and third columns) while second and fourth column also present the results for 
outward fl ows and stocks. In principle, both infl ows and outfl ows may contain information about 
16 See Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and UNCTAD and WTO (2016).
17 See, for instance, Mayer et al. (2018).
18  Bruno et al. (2016) follows this approach to deal with the selection bias arising from using only positive numbers. 
This alternative is also suggested in UNCTAD and WTO (2016).
19  According to the OECD, FDI fi nancial transactions may be negative if there is disinvestment, the parent borrowed 
money from its affi liate or reinvested earnings are negative. Negative FDI positions largely result when the loans from 
the affi liate to its parent exceed the loans and equity capital given by the parent to the affi liate (please see the Annex 
for further explanation). 
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the effect of EU membership but that information is not always consistent with each other due 
to statistical measurement issues.20 Therefore we use both datasets to check the robustness of 
the results.
The coefficient of the EU dummy is positive and significant in three 
of the four estimates. The effect of EU membership21 is an average increase of (intra EU) 
FDI inflows close to 40% and higher on stocks (about 80%). The estimates on stocks are 
higher than those obtained previously22 while the impact on inflows is similar to those 
estimated in other studies.23 The existence of a FTA also increases FDI inflows in a 
similar magnitude to EU membership but it seems to be a short lived effect since there is 
no significant impact on stocks. There has not been a significant impact on FDI inflows 
to the UK from other EU countries, but the entrance of new members have increased 
the outflows from the UK. This latter estimate suggests the UK plays a role as a platform 
for FDI flows into EU members. 
The effect of a further step in the European integration process is considered in 
Table 2. The creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) might have boosted FDI flows 
across the region by reducing exchange and liquidity risks throughout the widespread use 
20  They may also involve a very different number of observations because the reporting countries do not report equally 
inflows and outflows, flows or stocks.
21 Given by ((exp β1 )–1).
22 See Straathof et al. (2008).
23 See Bruno et al. (2016) and UK Treasury (2016).
EU: dummy variable which is equal to 1 if both reporting and partner countries are members of the EU, except when the UK is involved.
EU_uk_r: dummy variable which is equal to 1 if UK is the reporting country and the partner is a EU member.
EU_uk_p: dummy variable which is equal to 1 if UK is the partner country and the reporting one is a EU member.
FTA: dummy variable which is equal to 1 if both reporting and partner countries are members of a free trade agreement.
Standard errors in brackets, robust (cluster reporting country). Stars indicate statistical significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EU 0.33**
(0.15)
0.30*
(0.16)
0.10
(0.17)
0.04
(0.16)
0.61**
(0.28)
0.64**
(0.25)
0.58*
(0.30)
0.56*
(0.30)
EU_uk_r 0.08
(0.24)
0.34*
(0.18)
-0.16
(0.25)
0.07
(0.32)
EU_uk_p -0.31
(0.46)
-0.17
(0.52)
0
collinear
0
collinear
FTA 0.32***
(0.10)
0.30**
(0.10)
0.05
(0.13)
0.02
(0.13)
0.06
(0.17)
0.07
(0.16)
0.27
(0.18)
0.26
(0.17)
Fixed Effects country-pair,
country-time
country-pair,
country-time
country-pair,
country-time
country-pair,
country-time
country-pair,
country-time
country-pair,
country-time
country-pair,
country-time
country-pair,
country-time
Observations 20,418 20,418 24,799 24,799 6,509 6,509 9,020 9,020
Period of time 1986-2013 1986-2013 1986-2013 1986-2013 1986-2013 1986-2013 1986-2013 1986-2013
Number of groups 34 34 33 33 33 33 34 34
R2 (adjusted) 0.83 0.83 0.81 0.81 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Dependent Variable OLS (log)
skcotS-tuOskcotS-nIswolftuOswolfnI
EU EFFECT ON FDI TABLE 1
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of a single currency in the Euro area.24 The expansion of European value chains was 
supported by the EMU creation. The vertical integration associated to value chains boosted 
trade across Europe and FDI as a complement to trade (vertical FDI). This new framework 
might have brought FDI into the region from outside countries (extended market effect), 
especially  from those with large multinational companies. To the extent that the Euro also 
increased financial integration and reduced the cost of capital, investments from countries 
outside the region might have also been boosted. In this process the role played by the UK 
as a member of the EU with very developed and deep financial markets might have been 
particularly relevant. Thus the UK might have worked as a kind of gateway for companies from 
24 See Petroulas (2007) and Sousa and Lochard (2011).
EU: dummy variable which is equal to 1 if both reporting and partner countries are members of the EU, except when the UK is involved.
EU_uk_r: dummy variable equal to 1 if UK is the reporting country and the partner is a EU member.
EU_uk_p: dummy variable equal to 1 if UK is the partner country and the reporting one is a EU member.
EMU, EMU_uk_r and EMU_uk_p: similar definitions for EMU members at the launch date (1999).
out_EMU_r : dummy variable equal to 1 (since 1999) if the reporting country was an EMU member in 1999 and the partner country is out of EMU (11 countries which 
are the largest investors in UK).
out_EMU_p: dummy variable equal to 1 (since 1999) if the partner country was an EMU member in 1999 and the reporting country is out of EMU (in a group 11 
countries).
out_EMU_uk_r: equals 1 (since 1999) if the reporting country is UK and the partner is a non-EMU country (in the group of 11 countries).
out_EMU_uk_p: equals 1 (since 1999) if the partner country is UK and the reporting one is a non-EMU country (11 countries).
FTA: dummy variable which is equal to 1 if both reporting and partner countries are members of a free trade agreement.
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.33**
(0.14)
0.32**
(0.14)
0.33**
(0.14)
0.32**
(0.14)
0.10
(0.17)
0.03
(0.16)
0.10
(0.17)
0.03
(0.16)
EU_uk_r 0.34*
(0.18)
0.37**
(0.18)
EU_uk_p -0.16
(0.51)
-0.17
(0.50)
EMU -0.14
(0.26)
-0.20
(0.26)
-0.28
(0.31)
-0.29
(0.27)
0.03
(0.19)
-0.01
(0.18)
-0.07
(0.20)
-0.00
(0.19)
EMU_uk_r 0.33*
(0.18)
0.60***
(0.20)
0.19
(0.13)
0.25
(0.16)
EMU_uk_p -0.38
(0.26)
-0.33
(0.40)
-0.37
(0.32)
-0.61
(0.57)
out_EMU_r -0.32
(0.25)
-0.36**
(0.17)
out_EMU_p -0.24
(0.24)
0.01
(0.16)
out_EMU_uk_r 0.45**
(0.20)
0.23
(0.15)
out_EMU_uk_p 0.14
(0.43)
-0.35
(0.56)
FTA 0.32***
(0.09)
0.32***
(0.09)
0.32***
(0.09)
0.31***
(0.10)
0.05
(0.13)
0.02
(0.13)
0.05
(0.13)
0.02
(0.13)
Fixed Effects country-pair,
country-time
country-pair,
country-time
country-pair,
country-time
country-pair,
country-time
country-pair,
country-time
country-pair,
country-time
country-pair,
country-time
country-pair,
country-time
Observations 20,418  20,418  20,418  20,418  24,799 24,799 24,799 24,799
Period of time 1986-2013 1986-2013 1986-2013 1986-2013 1986-2013 1986-2013 1986-2013 1986-2013
Number of groups 34 34 34 34 33 33 33 33  
R2 (adjusted) 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81
EU
OLS (log)
swolftuOswolfnI
EU AND EMU LAUNCH EFFECTS ON FDI FLOWS TABLE 2
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countries outside the region to enter European markets. To explore both the effects on intra-
Euro FDI fl ows and on those with non-Euro countries, additional dummies are included in 
the gravity equations. One variable for Euro membership at the starting year (1999)25 
and two dummies for the potential impact on bilateral FDI between the UK and Euro 
members (one identifi es observations when the UK is a reporting country and the other when 
the UK is a partner country) allow to capture intra-Euro effects, as well as the possible UK 
role as a platform for increased FDI activity around the Euro area creation. Four additional 
variables give account of possible extended market effects on FDI into Euro countries 
and into the UK from a set of countries outside the Euro area that are the largest international 
or global investors in the British economy.26
The impact of EU membership on FDI infl ows is confi rmed in these new estimates 
(Table 2), as well as the effect of having signed a free trade agreement. The results in Table 2 
do not point, however, to a particular effect on FDI fl ows among starting Euro members, neither 
with infl ow nor outfl ow data. This is a controversial issue in the empirical literature.27 As argued 
in several analyses, there is a considerable overlap between the countries participating in the 
Single Market and EU membership and those integrating the Euro. This usually gives rise to 
collinearity and identifi cation problems in estimations. On the other hand, a signifi cant positive 
effect on UK infl ows from Euro members is found which suggests the Euro had a relevant impact 
on the UK even though this country was not a member of the single currency, possibly due to its 
deep and developed fi nancial markets. The coeffi cient of outfl ows from the UK to Euro members 
is close to be signifi cant at 10% level. Lastly, infl ows from non-Euro countries (most of them out 
of the EU) into the UK were also increased, pointing to some kind of extended market effect 
on the UK from the creation of the Euro area. Interestingly, countries participating in the single 
currency did not seem to have benefi ted from this extended market effect, which is in line with 
fi ndings of Sousa and Lochard (2011). A set of similar specifi cations was also estimated for stock 
data, being signifi cant a smaller number of effects as in Table 1 estimations. The coeffi cients 
are rather similar but their standard errors are larger, possibly due to a higher persistence and 
a smaller number of observations in stocks data.
To give account of the likelihood of positive fi gures and the selection bias that might 
arise, the previous gravity equations were estimated by using a Heckman selection model for 
fl ows data (table 3). In the selection equation the regressors are the EU and FTA dummies, 
PIB per capita (partner country) and a proxy variable of the entry costs of investing in foreign 
countries – the number of time periods in the sample with FDI activity for each country-pair –, 
which is supposed to infl uence the likelihood of a country starting direct investment into a foreign 
country but not its intensity or magnitude. This exclusion restriction is required for the Heckman 
model to be properly applied. 
25  In 1999 the Euro area members were: Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
26  This set of countries includes Australia, Canada, China, Hong-Kong, Korea, India, Japan, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the United States.
27  While Petroulas (2007) and Sousa and Lochard (2011) fi nd a positive intra-Euro effect, Flam and Norstrom (2008) 
and Dinga and Dingovà (2011) do not obtain evidence of a signifi cant impact from the EMU creation. 
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EU: dummy variable which is equal to 1 if both reporting and partner countries are members of the EU, except when the UK is involved.
EU_uk_r: dummy variable equal to 1 if UK is the reporting country and the partner is a EU member.
EU_uk_p: dummy variable equal to 1 if UK is the partner country and the reporting one is a EU member.
EMU, EMU_uk_r and EMU_uk_p: similar definitions for EMU members at the launch date (1999).
out_EMU_r : dummy variable equal to 1 (since 1999) if the reporting country was an EMU member in 1999 and the partner country is out of EMU (11 countries which 
are the largest investors in UK).
out_EMU_p: dummy variable equal to 1 (since 1999) if the partner country was an EMU member in 1999 and the reporting country is out of EMU (group of 11 countries).
out_EMU_uk_r: equals 1 (since 1999) if the reporting country is UK and the partner is a non-EMU country (in the group of 11 countries).
out_EMU_uk_p: equals 1 (since 1999) if the partner country is UK and the reporting one is a non-EMU country (11 countries).
FTA: dummy variable which is equal to 1 if both reporting and partner countries are members of a free trade agreement.
PIB_p: PIB per capita of partner country.
nn_fdi: number of time periods in the sample with FDI activity for each country-pair.
Standard errors in brackets, robust (cluster reporting country). Stars indicate statistical significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Dependent Variable
( main equation)
)4()3()2()1(
1.45***
(0.23)
1.47***
(0.24)
1.15***
(0.17)
1.10***
(0.15)
EU_uk_r 0.23
(0.16)
EU_uk_p 0.88**
(0.38)
EMU 0.25
(0.27)
0.29
(0.25)
1.00***
(0.34)
0.86***
(0.33)
EMU_uk_r 0.65***
(0.15)
0.55***
(0.15)
EMU_uk_p 1.33***
(0.36)
0.97**
(0.50)
out_EMU_r 0.00
(0.22)
0.74***
(0.27)
out_EMU_p 0.29
(0.21)
-0.23
(0.33)
out_EMU_uk_r 0.29**
(0.12)
0.51***
(0.10)
out_EMU_uk_p 0.49*
(0.26)
0.17
(0.30)
FTA 0.65***
(0.19)
0.67***
(0.19)
Fixed Effects time, reporter and partner 
country
time, reporter and partner 
country
time, reporter and partner 
country
time, reporter and partner 
country
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Selection equation
EU 0.15
(0.08)
0.15
(0.08)
0.03
(0.07)
0.03
(0.07)
FTA 0.16
(0.07)
0.16
(0.07)
0.21
(0.05)
0.21
(0.05)
PIB_p 0.26
(0.04)
0.26
(0.04)
0.07
(0.02)
0.07
(0.02)
nn_FDI 0.08
(0.01)
0.08
(0.01)
0.10
(0.01)
0.10
(0.01)
EU
Heckman estimates
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 Most of the previous estimations results are also obtained with this new procedure 
that, in general, yields higher values for most of the signifi cant coeffi cients, thus suggesting 
a negative bias in the previous estimates.28 The most relevant difference in the Heckman 
estimates presented in Table 3 refers to the relationship between the UK and the single 
currency members. Signifi cant and positive coeffi cients are estimated both for UK infl ows 
from and outfl ows into Euro area member countries. These signifi cant effects are obtained with 
both the infl ow and outfl ow databases.29 The assumption that the UK has played an important 
role as a hub that reallocates FDI across Euro members seems to be highly supported by 
the data. This role of the UK as a hub has also involved FDI from the set of the largest international 
investors in the British economy above referred. Not only the UK acted as a gateway to enter 
Euro countries’ markets, as detected in the coeffi cients in Table 2, but also signifi cant positive 
effects are obtained for the UK outfl ows into this set of global investors. A second difference 
is a signifi cant positive impact on intra-Euro FDI fl ows according to the outfl ows information, 
though this effect is not signifi cant with infl ows data. Finally, the launch of the EMU seems 
to have boosted FDI outfl ows from Euro members into outside the region, while there was not 
additional FDI brought into the Euro area.30 Nonetheless, an indirect impact came up through 
the UK, which received increased infl ows from global investors and reallocated them across 
Euro area members.
4 Conclusions
Countries joining the EU experience an increase in inward FDI fl ows, an effect found in other 
studies. UK leaving the EU and the Single Market will likely result in reduced FDI activity between 
the EU and the UK. In order to try to ascertain the potential Brexit effect on European countries, 
the analysis presented in this note tries to pay closer attention to the bilateral effects on fl ows 
between the UK and other EU countries as well as between the UK and Euro area members.
Post-referendum developments in FDI vis-à-vis the UK show evidence of a 
slowdown in gross FDI fl ows from the four biggest EU economies into the UK, as well 
as a fall in greenfi eld FDI projects announced by EU countries and the US. Estimates 
of the European integration effect on FDI based on historical data and gravity models 
suggest that EU membership increased intra-EU FDI fl ows, but the evidence on a signifi cant 
single currency effect on Euro area countries is not robust across different estimates. 
The empirical results of the gravity model highly support a positive impact of the single 
currency launch on the infl ows into the UK and its outfl ows vis-à-vis Euro countries. 
The gravity equations also point to an extended market effect which increased FDI into 
the UK from a set of countries outside the Euro area that are global investors. It appears 
28  The existence of correlation in the residuals of the gravity and selection equations (table 4) makes clear the need of their 
joint estimation (as in the Heckman model) to obtain consistent estimates. 
29  For example, the coeffi cient of the variable EMU_uk_r in the fi rst column of Table 4 (0.65) points to an increase in UK 
infl ows from the euro countries (partners) if infl ows database is used. When outfl ows information is used, this same 
effect is captured by the coeffi cient of EMU_uk_p (0.97) which gives the impact on outfl ows from euro members into 
the UK (partner).
30  Sousa and Lochard (2011) also fi nd this result. EMU members invested more in non-EMU countries after the launch of 
the single currency but non-EMU countries have not invested more in the euro-zone.
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that the UK has played a double role: as a gateway for those investor countries to 
enter European markets, on the one hand; and as a hub to reallocate these infl ows and 
those coming from Euro countries across the Euro area itself, on the other. This makes 
the projection of Brexit effects fairly complex. 
The empirical evidence presented in this note suggests that the disconnection of 
the UK from the EU may have further implications for foreign direct investment than just reverting 
the effect of EU membership. Larger trade barriers and lower capital mobility between the UK 
and the Euro area will likely have a negative impact on FDI activity in the UK and might have, 
in the short run, a negative effect in the Euro area. 
A second element derived from this analysis is that the effect of EU and 
the Euro integration processes on FDI fl ows of European countries might have been 
underestimated in previous studies using the logarithmic transformation without taking into 
account the implicit selection of considering only positive fi gures. When using an estimation 
method adequate to deal with the possible selection bias that may arise, most effects are 
found to be higher than with the usual specifi cations in logarithms. Nonetheless, some caution 
would be advisable when using these estimates, given the wide range obtained in this study 
and in the empirical literature. A more robust and reliable feature of the FDI gravity models 
is the signifi cance of specifi c effects.
ANNEX: Methodological and compilation issues concerning the measurement of FDI
Data on Foreign Direct Investment are compiled and statistics are made available by several 
international organisations, including amongst other the OECD, the IMF, the European 
Commission/Eurostat and the ECB. Different sources of data benefi t from the existence of 
the 4th edition of the OECD Benchmark Defi nition of Foreign Direct Investment which serves 
as a single point of reference for all that is related to FDI and its measurement. The Benchmark 
is the result of the work by the international community of FDI statisticians that was undertaken 
at the request of the OECD and in cooperation with the IMF and other partner international 
organisations. 
The Benchmark Defi nition recommends that FDI data be presented in two ways: 
on a straightforward asset/liability basis (i.e. under the asset/liability principle) and refl ecting 
the direction of direct investment infl uence (i.e. under the directional principle). The two principles 
are described as follows:
FDI according to the asset/liability principle 
FDI aggregates as a part of national macro-economic statistics are based on 
the asset/liability principle. They are consistent with monetary, fi nancial, and other balance 
sheet data, balance of payments (BOP) and international investment position (IIP) statistics, 
as well as with the components of national accounts statistics, facilitating thus the comparison 
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between the several data sets. The data presented on this basis, while compiled distinguishing 
the nature of the relationship between the several FDI counterparts, do not incorporate any 
offsetting of reverse direct investment transactions or positions in equity or debt between a 
direct investment enterprise and its direct investor and between fellow enterprises.
FDI according to the directional principle
The typical direction of direct investment is from the direct investor to its direct investment enterprise. 
However, there may also be fl ows in the reverse direction (when the direct investment enterprise 
invests or lends funds to its direct investor, but owing less than 10% of its equity, which are then 
equivalent to the withdrawal of investment) and between fellow enterprises. Massive investment 
fl ows into and out of a country may not be of primary interest to analysts of direct investment 
if they refl ect merely a pass-through or round-tripping of direct investment funds. Therefore, 
users seeking to analyse the economic impact of FDI from the perspective of the direction of 
infl uence/control would rather focus on investments recorded according to the directional principle 
both for transactions and positions. Under the directional principle, direct investment is shown as 
either direct investment abroad (outward) or direct investment in the reporting economy (inward). 
FDI statistics compiled according to the directional principle show outward investments and 
inward investments taking into account reverse investments (i.e.) as well as investment into fellow 
enterprises - the direction in the latter case depending on whether the ultimate controlling parent 
of the resident fellow enterprise is a resident or a non-resident of the compiling economy. 
Data on both the asset and liability presentation and the directional principle presentation 
are useful for different kinds of analysis. The directional principle is a presentation of direct 
investment data organized according to the direction of the direct investment relationship. 
It can be contrasted with the asset and liability presentation of aggregates used in standard 
components of the 6th edition of the IMF Balance of Payments and International Investment 
Position Manual, which are organized according to whether the investment relates to an asset 
or liability. In this Manual, the directional presentation appears as supplementary items, since the 
standard presentation for FDI under BOP relies on the asset/liability basis. The difference between 
the asset-liability and the directional presentations arises from differences in the treatment 
of reverse investment and some investment between fellow enterprises, however the FDI total 
net position for both presentations should be the same. 
FDI fi nancial transactions may be negative for three reasons. First, if there is disinvestment 
in assets - that is, the direct investor sells its interest in a direct investment enterprise to a third 
party or back to the direct investment enterprise. Second, if the parent borrowed money from 
its affi liate or if the affi liate paid off a loan from its direct investor. Third, if reinvested earnings are 
negative. Reinvested earnings are negative if the affi liate loses money or if the dividends paid out 
to the direct investor are greater than the income recorded in that period. Negative FDI positions 
largely result when the loans from the affi liate to its parent exceed the loans and equity capital 
given by the parent to the affi liate. This is most likely to occur when FDI statistics are presented 
on a directional basis and by partner country.
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Apart from these methodological issues, some caveats on data sources, compilation 
practices and periodicity and timeliness of availability of FDI time series data may be identifi ed, 
illustrating the somehow uneasy task of collecting FDI bilateral statistics internationally comparable 
and readily available in a short period of time.
The IMF publishes data for FDI fl ows and stocks within the BOP/IIP framework. These 
are national data not broken down by counterparty country. The geographical details for FDI 
stocks are only collected via the IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS). The CDIS 
is an annual exercise that collects data on FDI stocks at the end of each year (starting with 
data corresponding to end-2009) with counterparty information received from more than 100 
economies. All participants in the CDIS report data on their inward direct investment and most 
participants also provide data on their outward direct investment. This is the statistical output 
made available by the IMF where bilateral FDI stocks fi gures reported by each country vis-à-vis 
each other specifi c country, may be gathered.
The ECB collects and publishes statistics of BOP/IIP, including the FDI component, for 
the Euro area countries as a whole, following the asset/liability principle, on a quarterly basis. 
For additional information broken down by geography, the OECD collects such FDI 
fi nancial items by partner country, but not on a quarterly basis, only on an annual basis.The 
results are typically available by the end of the following year. Bilateral OECD FDI statistics are 
presented on a directional basis, not on an asset/liability basis. Also bilateral FDI fl ows and stocks 
related to inward and outward FDI vis-à-vis a certain country are available on an immediate 
counterpart country basis, while ultimate investing country FDI positions are also available but 
for a few countries.
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